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Beliefs and desires in the predictive
brain
Daniel Yon 1,2✉, Cecilia Heyes3 & Clare Press2
Bayesian brain theories suggest that perception, action and cognition arise as
animals minimise the mismatch between their expectations and reality. This
principle could unify cognitive science with the broader natural sciences, but
leave key elements of cognition and behaviour unexplained.
In everyday life, we tend to explain the behaviour of ourselves and other creatures in terms of
beliefs and desires. For example, we might say that a rat pulls a lever or a scientist runs an
experiment because they believe that certain outcomes will ensue (e.g. a piece of food or a piece
of data) and because these are outcomes they desire (e.g. because they are hungry or curious).
The idea that action is motivated by belief-like and desire-like representations—respectively
defining which states of the world are most probable and most valuable (Box 1)—is also a key
feature of theories across the cognitive sciences. For example, cognitive models suggest goal-
directed action depends on separate associations between actions and outcomes (instrumental
beliefs) and outcomes and values (incentives)1,2. A similar distinction is fundamental to models
of economic choice, where decisions are thought to reflect a combination of utilities (how good is
this option?) and probabilities (how certain am I to obtain it?)3.
Box 1
Belief-like and desire-like mental states
What are belief-like and desire-like states? In colloquial use beliefs and desires are typically thought of as explicit personal-level
propositional representations—sentences in the head, such as “I think my keys are in my pocket”, “I want to go to bed”. However,
in this article and in line with many cognitive scientists, we assume that belief-like and desire-like states can be subpersonal and/or
implicit (e.g. patterns of activity in sensory systems, loss functions in reward systems).
We contend that explaining behaviour requires a clear distinction between belief-like states and desire-like states, where the former
track what is probable about the world and the latter track what is valuable to the agent. Mental states differ in their direction-of-
fit17—whereas belief-like states have a mind-to-world direction (i.e. it is adaptive for agents when their beliefs are adjusted to fit the
world), desire-like states have a world-to-mind direction (i.e. it is adaptive for agents when the world matches their desires). In the
desert landscape envisaged by the above predictive processing accounts, this distinction is dissolved and behaviour is explained in
terms of a single predictive model that can both adjust the world and be adjusted by it. Critics have argued that predictions seem to
lack the motivational force needed to work as desires without implausible assumptions about the number or specificity of
predictions wired into the model18, though proponents of these predictive processing accounts argue this issue can be solved by
flexibly adjusting the weight on information flowing in different directions throughout the cortical hierarchy (but see Box 2).
However, recently cognitive scientists have explored the possibility that the familiar double act
of beliefs and desires can be replaced by theories that explain behaviour using only one kind of
internal state: prediction (Fig. 1)4. These predictive processing accounts based on the free energy
principle5 assume that the brain acts as a model of the extracranial world, optimised to fit
information arriving at the senses. According to this view, the brain is structured in a hier-
archical way such that higher cortical areas embody hypotheses about the activity expected in
lower areas, which in turn send information up the processing hierarchy signalling the mismatch
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or ‘error’ between prediction and reality. This structure allows the
brain to optimise its fit to the outside world through two kinds of
process or ‘inference’. The first is perceptual inference, where
incoming sensory signals are used to adjust hypotheses at higher
levels, such that the hypotheses more closely match the outside
world. The second is active inference, where strong top-down
predictions engage muscles and organs to drive action, changing
states of the body and the world such that they conform with the
prior predictions. More simply put, the brain can either revise its
predictions to match the world or change the world to make the
predictions come true.
Proponents of this view4 suggest that these models leave us with
a desert landscape view of cognition, where mental states once
thought to be crucial in explaining behaviour—such as goals,
drives and desires—are reduced to predictions. Under this account
“there is no essential difference between goals or desires and
beliefs or predictions”6 and “desired outcomes [are] simply…those
that an agent believes, a priori, it will obtain”7. According to this
view, the hungry rat presses the lever because it expects itself to
press, since it expects not to be hungry in the future. Neu-
roscientists and philosophers defending these models have
recently reaffirmed that desires emerge as webs of prior beliefs8,
dissolving the distinction between beliefs and desires: “from motor
control to expected utility theory…as each of these constructs is
absorbed…the landscape of explanations becomes progressively
deserted. Is this something to be celebrated or resisted9?”
The predictive processing scheme has the potential to unify
cognitive science with other life and social sciences through a
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Fig. 1 Beliefs, desires, predictions and precision. a Left: Classic approaches across the cognitive sciences assume that behaviour is controlled by separate
mechanisms representing likely (belief-like) and valuable states of the world (desire-like). Right: However, recent predictive processing models assume
behaviour can be explained entirely in terms of predictions—describing a desert landscape view of the mind that dispenses with goals, drives and reward.
b Predictive processing accounts suggest we refine our internal models of the world by combining initial hypotheses with incoming evidence. In these
theories, how (or whether) our hypotheses become updated depends on beliefs about the precision of these two quantities. When agents believe prior
predictions are more precise than incoming evidence (bottom left) hypotheses are stubborn and more closely resemble our initial expectations19.
Conversely, when agents believe sampled evidence is more precise (bottom right), incoming signals have a larger impact on subsequent hypotheses about
the world (Box 2).
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common set of principles. For example, it can be shown that any
plausible biological system—whether brain, bacterium or birch
tree—behaves as though it possesses a predictive model of its
environment, and acts in ways that improve the fit between this
model and the outside world10. It has also been suggested that the
same mathematical principles can explain cultural evolution11.
These models are useful to scientists who seek continuity between
the principles explaining human and animal behaviour and those
explaining the rest of the natural world.
However, the unifying potential of such predictive processing
models may come at a cost to explanatory power. There may still
be good reasons for the cognitive scientist to retain the concepts
of belief-like and desire-like states in their theoretical arsenal. For
example, predictive processing models of active inference assume
that we act by generating (false) predictions about the states of
our body (e.g. my hand is over there) and enslaving peripheral
reflexes to make the prediction come true (i.e. move it). While
this formulation provides an elegant account of how motor
commands are generated and unpacked in the spinal cord, and
there would be little dispute that goals are achieved through
error-minimisation processes12, a key component of this scheme
is the assumption that agents suspend perception of their actions
until their predictions are realised—reducing the weight or ‘pre-
cision’ afforded to incoming sensory signals13 (Box 2). This
assumption is required because one state plays the role of belief
and desire—I cannot simultaneously represent with one state that
my hand is by my side, and that I would like it to be grasping the
mug. These assumptions are difficult to reconcile with evidence
that agents can simultaneously act and perceptually monitor their
actions as they unfold, for example, when adapting to unexpected
perturbations in a visually guided reaching movement12. It is
unclear if there is a straightforward solution to this problem. This
kind of sensory-guided goal-directed action is compatible with
there being some levels in the hierarchy that do not distinguish
between belief-like and desire-like information1,11 but not with
the absence of this distinction at all levels.
Box 2
Precision-weighting predictions and evidence
Predictive processing models have often likened the brain to a scientist, suggesting that it
generates hypotheses about the outside world (in the form of predictions) which are
tested against data (sensory evidence)19. Recent predictive processing models deploy the
idea of precision-weighting, such that the weight or precision afforded to top-down
predictions or bottom-up evidence can be flexibly adjusted. For example, when precision
on sensory evidence is high, incoming signals are given more weight in updating
hypotheses. This may be adaptive if incoming evidence is especially strong, if agents find
themselves in new environments without strong expectations, or if they suspect the world
and its contents might rapidly change. In contrast, when precision on the predictions is
high, hypotheses are stubborn and insensitive to incoming data. This may be adaptive
when incoming sensory evidence is noisy or ambiguous, agents are very confident about
what to expect, or they believe the world is likely to be stable—such that predictions
based on the past will apply in the future.
Predictive processing models depend on the idea of precision-weighting to explain the
action, assuming that agents have predictions (e.g. “I am holding the cup”, “I do not have
low blood sugar”) that are assigned especially high precision6. Assigning an especially
strong weight to such a prediction means that the mismatch between expectation and
reality (the prediction error) is resolved by engendering actions (e.g. grasping, eating)
rather than changing the prediction. However, affording these predictions high precision
necessarily means reducing the precision afforded to evidence that could update them. In
other words, precision in these models is zero-sum20: assigning more weight to a top-
down prediction is equivalent to assigning less weight to bottom-up evidence (and vice
versa)19. As such, predictions that operate as desires cannot simultaneously operate as
(evidence-sensitive) beliefs.
Retaining the distinction between belief-like and desire-like
states may also help clinical scientists explain atypical aspects of
action. For example, studies of drug addiction have shown that
individuals can expect substances to be unrewarding, yet still feel
strong compulsions to consume them, with expectations about
the pleasantness of consumption (‘liking’) and about one’s future
actions (‘wanting’) subserved by dissociable mechanisms14. A
similar distinction may be important in obsessive-compulsive
disorder, where individuals feel strong urges to perform actions
they believe to be causally impotent15. Such experiences are dif-
ficult to explain without distinguishing desire-like and belief-like
mechanisms (Box 1).
The predictive processing framework is used by many scien-
tists, and it may be that some are implicitly committed to the
belief-desire distinction despite the ‘desert landscape’ view
emphatically defended by some of the framework’s key archi-
tects6. We propose it is important to retain a clear distinction
between beliefs and desires when explaining cognition and
behaviour. Intriguingly, this distinction could be explicitly rein-
troduced into predictive processing via the concept of deep
temporal models16. These accounts propose that agents can act in
ways that minimise future prediction errors, possessing separate
predictions about states of the world and predictions about
plausible actions they could perform. However, while it may be
tempting to identify the former and latter types of predictions as
beliefs and desires, theorists have not explicitly or implicitly taken
steps in this direction. We would welcome such steps, but they
would imply that the aim of unifying scientific explanation via the
concept of error-minimisation can be only partially achieved. The
desert landscape of cognition is not as featureless as it seems, and
we must accept that there is a discontinuity between different
types of mental state, and between error-minimising systems that
possess predictions about the future (e.g. animals) and those that
do not (e.g. viruses).
In conclusion, prominent predictive processing models have
suggested it is possible to abandon traditional concepts of belief
and desire, explaining all cognition and behaviour in terms of
predictions. This account holds promise for uniting the study of
the mind with the study of the natural world, but discarding these
concepts may limit cognitive science’s ability to explain the
subtleties of motivated action in health and disease. Though both
beliefs and desires could be crafted from the sands of a desert
landscape, the cognitive scientist may still find them to be as
different as concrete and glass.
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